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Abstract
This paper analyzes productivity and welfare losses from capital misallocation in a
general equilibrium model of occupational choice and financial intermediation. It studies the
effects of risk sharing with default and imperfect monitoring on the optimal allocation of
resources and derives endogenous leverage bounds. Information frictions have large impact on
entrepreneurs’ entry and firm-size decisions due to endogenous collateral requirements derived
from incentive compatible allocations. Leverage bounds derived from default and asymmetric
information constraints are then used to simulate the tradeoff from a macroprudential policy
aimed at mitigating the effects of unanticipated changes in information regime.
Keywords: Financial markets and the macroeconomy; Asymmetric and Private Information;
Occupational choice
JEL classification: E44; D82; J24
1 Introduction
Geanakoplos (2006) and Geanakoplos and Fostel (2012) show that collateral rates or leverage
can be more important to economic activity and prices than interest rates. The change in loan-
to-value ratio on new loans is an important source of economic crises, more important that
the debt-to-equity ratio. The collateral problem, rather than insufficient demand or irrational
behavior, seems to be one of the main causes of the recent financial crisis. During a leverage cycle
there is too much leverage in normal times and therefore too high asset prices and vice versa in
bad times.
The maximum leverage ratio is now perceived as potentially effective countercyclical metric
that helps to avoid excessive build-up during booms and the rapid deleveraging in times of stress,
a process that can destabilize the whole financial system. Importantly, one of the main reasons
for introducing leverage ratio restrictions was the observation that financial institutions that were
∗The author would like to acknowledge the support of the ADEMU project, “A Dynamic Economic and Monetary
Union”, funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Program under grant agreement N. 649396 (ADEMU). I
am grateful to Juan Carlos Conesa, Nezih Guner, Ctirad Slavik, Stanley Zin and the seminar participants at
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Goethe University, CERGE-EI, NYU Stern, University of Bilbao, University
of Venice, and University of Tokyo for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is based on a previous work
with Hugo Rodriguez-Mendizabal. All remaining errors are mine.
Address: CERGE-EI, Charles University and the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Politickych veznu 7,
111 21 Prague 1, Czech Republic. Email: radim.bohacek@cerge-ei.cz. Phone: (+420) 775 379 336.)
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severely affected by the financial crisis showed strong risk-based capital ratios before the crisis.
The maximum leverage ratio is supposed to complement the risk-based capital requirements as
a simple, transparent, politically neutral, non-risk based “backstop” to mitigate cyclical fluctu-
ations, being a tighter constraint in booms and a looser constraint in recessions. Countries that
have used a maximum leverage for mortgages (Canada, Switzerland, Hong Kong) have fared much
better during the Great Recession and have experienced much lower price volatility in housing
and financing markets.
Overall, regulation of the leverage ratio is expected to protect the borrowers/lenders against
the consequences of imprudent borrowing/lending, to constrain excessive credit growth and price
increases, and to reduce the amplitude of economic booms and busts. Leverage regulation can be
implemented within the financial system at the institutional level (bank capital to asset ratio) or
embedded for borrowers in collateral downpayment margins and ‘haircuts’.
This paper builds a general equilibrium model with financial intermediation and occupational
choice. It derives endogenous leverage bounds arising from an imperfect monitoring problem
and/or default. These leverage bounds are then used to simulate the tradeoff from the macro-
prudential regulation: in good times, restricting leverage is costly as it limits the efficient allo-
cation of resources to their most productive use. On the other hand, minimum downpayment
requirements provide incentives for accumulation of assets that prevent excessive deleveraging
during after a bad technology or information shock or after a change in the regulatory regime.
Using the evidence on financial frictions and entrepreneurial activity, I build a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and occupational choice, financial constraints
and endogenous financial markets. Each agent compares the expected value he or she would
obtain from being a worker to the expected value of becoming an entrepreneur. A worker receives
a wage while an entrepreneur establishes a firm with capital investment, employs other agents
as workers, and realizes profit from a decreasing-returns-to-scale production technology. The
occupational heterogeneity is important as workers (together with the less productive or uncon-
strained entrepreneurs) lend their assets to entrepreneurs who can use them more productively.
Financial intermediation thus allocates resources to the most productive use, reduces financing
constraints and increases efficiency.
A well functioning financial intermediation makes personal wealth less relevant when allocating
productive capital to managerial skills: the most talented entrepreneurs can enter and operate
firms closer to the optimal size. This in turn increases demand for labor and capital. General
equilibrium effects are crucial for entry/exit decisions. Higher equilibrium wages and interest
rates increase the opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur for the less talented agents. This
further improves the skill composition of entrepreneurs and increases the amount of resources
available to the most talented ones.
Under perfect risk-sharing and full information, financial intermediation allocates resources
to the most productive use regardless of the collateral position of a borrower: the most talented
entrepreneurs operate firms at the optimal size. As competition among entrepreneurs reduces
their profits, welfare gains mostly apply to workers who benefit from higher equilibrium wages
and the possibility to receive higher return on their savings (similar to Geanakoplos and Fostel
2012). Numerical simulations show that higher quality of financial markets increases efficiency,
improves average welfare as well as reduces inequality.
With asymmetric information and/or default, financial markets cannot provide full insurance
against risk. Instead, banks restrict lending by demanding collateral, that is, financial markets
impose an endogenous maximum leverage bound on each borrower. Consequently, high produc-
tivity but poor entrepreneurs (firms) are not able to borrow the optimal amount of capital while
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Figure 1: Efficiency Tradeoffs from Leverage Regulation
low productivity entrepreneurs with assets (collateral) become relatively more important.1 The
misallocation is especially severe with respect to the marginal entrepreneur who is indifferent
between being a worker or an entrepreneur, and whose skills are higher if leverage is possible
under efficient financial markets.
Incentive compatible allocations from these information and financial frictions can be mapped
into leverage bounds, i.e., required downpayments or margins (the inverse of the leverage ratio).
The average downpayment margin increases to 22% in the case of default, and up to 50% in the
imperfect monitoring economy. When default is present together with imperfect monitoring, the
margin is even higher, depending on the recovery rate. Naturally, these incentives lead to higher
accumulation of assets in the steady state needed as a collateral for obtaining loans. Allocation
inefficiencies have large adverse effects on aggregate productivity, welfare and inequality. Default
in combination with information asymmetries lowers welfare by 7-14% (frictions increase the rent
to entrepreneurs while welfare of workers falls by 25-40%).
These leverage bounds are then used to simulate policy regimes with imposed collateral mar-
gins on steady states with full risk sharing that are subsequently exposed to default and/or
information frictions (imperfect monitoring). The macroprudential policies are implemented by
imposing the same maximum leverage ratio (or, equivalently, minimum collateral margins) in
both the initial risk-sharing steady state and the imperfect monitoring/default steady states.
The goal is to evaluate the effects of macroprudential policies on the steady-state allocations and
their behavior during the transition to new steady-state, i.e., the tradeoff between lower efficiency
in the steady state and lower efficiency losses during a crisis.
1Resource misallocation across individual production units may account for a substantial share of the income
differences we observe across countries. For evidence see Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Banerjee et al. (2003), Banerjee
and Munshi (2004), or Alfaro et al. (2008). For other explanations of resource misallocation see the references in
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). In the quantitative macro models, resource reallocation derived from removing
inefficiencies in credit markets has large effects on output and measured TFP (see, among others, Buera et al.
(2010), Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2010), or Moll (2010)).
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The goal is to provide a simple regulation framework for mitigating the adverse effects of
information frictions. Figure 1 summarizes the efficiency tradeoffs from imposing leverage bounds.
The stars show GDP losses in the risk-sharing (x-axis) and imperfect-monitoring (y-axis) steady
states from imposing collateral margins on loans at 0%, 10%, ..., 40%. For example, imposing a
30% downpayment margin leads to 0.012% of GDP loss in the steady state with full risk sharing
and to 0.07% loss in the imperfect monitoring steady state, both relative to the respective zero-
margin steady states. When the change in information regime impacts the risk-sharing steady
state, the fall of GDP in the first period of transition is 2.9% (arrow to m = 30%). If there is
no collateral margin requirement and the unanticipated change of the information regime occurs,
the initial loss in transition is 7.1% (arrow to m = 0%). In the long-run steady states, general
equilibrium effects provide incentives to accumulate assets such that serve as buffer stock against
risk and collateral for potential entrepreneurial projects. Consequently, the resulting steady
state losses from leverage regulation can be contained around 1% of GDP for a 30% minimal
downpayment regulation. In general, the higher the regulation, the greater are the GDP losses
in the steady state and the smaller they are during a crisis.
The contribution of this papers is twofold. First, it develops a novel approach of modelling
asymmetric information. In particular, the adverse selection problem for entrepreneurial or firm
decisions can be applied to a wide variety of economic problems. Second, the paper simulates
macroprudential policy in an environment with imperfect monitoring and default, using the de-
rived leverage bounds. The incentive-compatible leverage bounds and optimal allocation of re-
sources are analyzed in a single unified framework in a dynamic, general equilibrium economy.2
The appendix contains important proofs and additional results. The online appendix shows
sensitivity results.
2 Entrepreneurial Activity and Credit Markets
This Section briefly describes the relationship between financial intermediation, entrepreneurship,
and wealth in the U.S. data. Following Gentry and Hubbard (2000), define an entrepreneur as
someone who combines upfront business investment with entrepreneurial skill to obtain the chance
of earning economic profits. According to the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF 1989), 8.7%
households report active business assets greater than $5,000 (9.5% report business assets greater
than $1,000). Similarly, in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID 1994), 10.4% of families
own a business or have a financial interest in some business enterprise.
De Nardi et al. (2007) document that U.S. entrepreneurs are characterized by their high
propensity to accumulate capital, risk taking, and committing skills and resources to their busi-
nesses. The Gini coefficient for family wealth is between 0.78 and 0.84, depending on the year
and survey (PSID and SCF, respectively). The Gini coefficient for family income is 0.45 in the
PSID and 0.54 in the SCF. In the PSID, the top 1 percent of families owns around 29% of the
total household wealth and around 8% of the total income. The top 5 percent owns already 50%
of the wealth and receives 20% of the income. Finally, the top decile owns more than 60% of the
wealth and receives more than 32% of the income.
The percentage of business families increases in higher wealth classes: Quadrini (1999a) doc-
uments that about half of all families in the top 5% are business families. At the same time,
the concentration of wealth among business families is not purely explained by the concentra-
2For an exogenously imposed risk sharing see Heathcote et al. (2009). Karaivanov et al. (2006) estimate credit
market imperfections due to limited liability and moral hazard in Thailand. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
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tion of income. Quadrini (1999b) and Gentry and Hubbard (2000) report that entrepreneurs
are wealthy because they not only earn more income but also save relatively more than workers.
Entrepreneurs, being such a small fraction of the population, receive 22% of the total income and
own 40% of the total wealth. The ratio of wealth to income is about twice as large for business
families (6.77 versus 2.94).
Available evidence suggests that entrepreneurs are constrained by their wealth. Based on
the National Longitudinal Survey, Evans and Leighton (1989) find that men with greater assets
are more likely to become self-employed all else being equal. They estimate in their model that
entrepreneurs can borrow up to 50% of their current assets.
Personal wealth and housing are important sources of collateral. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2010) study borrowing-constrained households and find that when the value of housing relative to
human wealth falls, loan collateral shrinks, borrowing (risk-sharing) declines, and the sensitivity
of consumption to income increases. Adrian and Shin (2010) find a negative relationship between
households’ total assets and leverage.3 Important contributions to the literature on leverage and
credit markets include Geanakoplos and Zame (2013), Dubey et al. (2005), Adrian and Shin
(2010), Adrian and Shin (2013), Geanakoplos and Fostel (2012), Geanakoplos and Zame (2013),
Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2010), or Brunnermeier et al. (2011).
The Federal Reserve Survey of Terms of Business Lending reveals that small loans are more
often secured by collateral. In 2000, of all commercial and industrial loans in the United States,
83% required collateral for loans smaller than $99,000, 74% for loans smaller than $1 million,
46.9% for loans smaller than $10 million, and only 31.7% for loans greater than $10 million. In
Europe, the 2010 ECB survey of small and medium size enterprises (SME) shows that around
60% of small and medium size enterprises (SME) use at least one source of debt financing. The
most prevalent source of debt financing has been the bank: 30% of companies have used bank
overdraft facilities or a credit line and 26% have received a bank loan.
Lack of collateral is the most significant obstacle for establishing a firm, with about 15% of
loans were fully rejected. See De Nardi et al. (2007) for a similar evidence for the United States.
Overall, the three largest sources of funding are the principal owner, commercial banks, and trade
creditors, which together account for over 70% of total small business finance.
Entrepreneurial income is more volatile than the labor income of workers. Heaton and Lucas
(2000) find that the median standard deviation of the growth rate of nonfarm proprietary income
is 64% annually while the median standard deviation of the growth rate of real wage income is only
35% annually. Entrepreneurial portfolios are very undiversified. Gentry and Hubbard (2000) find
that active businesses account for 42% of entrepreneurs’ assets (even in the top wealth classes).
In the survey of Characteristics of Business Owners (2002), seventy percent of the owners of
employer respondent firms reported that their business was their primary source of income. Not
only face entrepreneurs high risk in their occupation, it also has a future value compared to initial
income: Hamilton (2000) and Bohacek (2006) find evidence that most entrepreneurs enter and
persist in business despite the fact that they have lower initial earnings in paid employment, with
a median earnings differential of 35 percent. The turnover of business families is substantial.
Small firms pay fewer dividends, take on more debt, and invest more. In terms of the aggregate
value of small firm debt, almost 90% of credit comes from traditional sources, mostly lines of credit
and loans (Berger and Udell (1998)). Between 65 percent and 79 percent of entrepreneurs started
3This evidence is well depicted by the National Financing Conditions Index (NFCI) or the Shiller-Case Home
Price Index. For commercial and industrial loans see the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending
Practices by the Federal Reserve Board.
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their own business and almost half of entrepreneurs use their own or their family’s savings. Fazzari
and Petersen (1988) report that internal finance in the form of retained earnings generates the
majority of net funds for firms of all size categories: the average retention ratio is largest for small
firms (80%) and lowest for the largest firms (50%).
At the same time, entrepreneurial activity is a very important feature of the U.S. economy.
Small firms play an important role in innovation, technological change and productivity growth.
Davis et al. (1996) show that the rates of job creation and job destruction in U.S. manufacturing
firms decrease in firm size and that, conditional on the initial size, small firms grow faster than
large firms. According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, small businesses account for
half of all U.S. private-sector employment and produced 64 percent of net job growth in the
United States between 1993 and 2008.
The models in this paper attempt to replicate this list of data on entrepreneurial activity.
Motivated by the above empirical regularities, agents will be identified by their accumulated level
of assets and entrepreneurial ability. In the presence of financial constraints, occupational choice
and entrepreneurial decisions will be functions of this individual state and equilibrium prices.
3 The Economy
There is a large number of agents who differ in the amount of accumulated assets and their
talent (productivity). Each agent decides whether to allocate his talent to be an entrepreneur
and establish a firm or to be a worker and work for an entrepreneur. There exists a financial
intermediation sector that provides credit services. All shocks are idiosyncratic and there is no
aggregate uncertainty.
Each agent is endowed with a unit of time and evaluates streams of consumption c with a
utility function
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct)
]
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) and u : <+ → < is a bounded, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice
differentiable continuous function that satisfies the Inada conditions.
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of every period, agents are identified
by a level of accumulated assets a ∈ A = [0,∞) and by an idiosyncratic productivity shock
z ∈ Z = [z, z]. This productivity level is carried from the previous period and represents a signal
for the effective productivity the agent will have later in the period when production takes place,
z′ ∈ Z. Given a and the signal z, first, each agents makes the occupational choice and decides
whether to become a worker or an entrepreneur. Workers deposit their assets at the financial
intermediaries and offer their labor services in the market. Entrepreneurs decide how much capital
and labor to use in production. Importantly, entrepreneurs have to make their business plan and
commit to capital and labor before their effective productivity shock z′ is realized. This feature
of the model reflects the riskiness of entrepreneurial occupation. Furthermore, this setup allows
for risk sharing and associated problems of imperfect monitoring. In the literature, entrepreneurs
usually do not face any risk from running their businesses as their occupational and input decisions
are made after the productivity shock is observed (for example Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Meh
(2008), or Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)). Each agent draws his effective productivity level z′
from a first-order Markov process with a monotone transition function Q that satisfies the Feller
property and the mixing condition. Denote the transition process of each occupation as QW and
QE .
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At the end of the period, the effective productivity shock of each agent z′ is realized, production
at firms takes place, workers are paid their wages and entrepreneurs realize profits or losses.
Finally, each agent decides how much to consume c and the amount of savings a′. The effective
productivity shock z′ is carried to the next period as the signal for future productivity shocks.
All assets depreciate at the rate δ ∈ (0, 1).
Banks are in the business of intermediating credit. The supply of credit comes from depositors,
i.e. all workers as well as entrepreneurs with assets in excess of their capital needs. The demand
for credit is from entrepreneurs whose efficient size of firm in terms of capital is larger than their
accumulated assets. The intermediation technology is costless at an equilibrium interest rate r
described below.
3.1 A Worker’s Budget Constraint
If an agent with assets a and an idiosyncratic signal ability shock z decides to be a worker, his
budget constraint is
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r)a+ wz′, (1)
where r is the equilibrium interest rate, w is the equilibrium wage common to all workers, and z′
is a worker’s idiosyncratic productivity level.
3.2 An Entrepreneur’s Budget Constraint
Entrepreneurs hire labor from a pool of perfectly diversified workers whose average productivity
is z˜. An entrepreneur (a, z) who commits k units of capital, hires n workers, and draws an
idiosyncratic effective productivity shock z′, produces according to a production function
y(z′|a, z) = z′f (k(a, z), z˜n(a, z)) = z′ (k(a, z)α(z˜n(a, z))1−α)θ , (2)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and θ < 1. The production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale which, as
in Lucas (1978), can be thought of as capturing the presence of decreasing returns to managerial
control.
The capital input k can be smaller or greater than assets a. Denoting the amount borrowed
b = k − a, an entrepreneur’s budget constraint for each z′ is
c+ a′ ≤ (1− δ)k + z′f(k, z˜n)− wz˜n− (1 + r)b for each z′ ∈ Z,
where b > 0 if the entrepreneur borrows and b < 0 if he is a depositor. Denote the transfer from
the entrepreneur to the bank as the repayment amount when a productivity shock z′ is realized as
ρ(z′) = (1 + r)b so that the budget constraint can be written consistently through all information
environments as
c+ a′ ≤ (1− δ)k + z′f(k, z˜n)− wz˜n− ρ(z′) for each z′ ∈ Z. (3)
I abstract from fixed costs associated with operating a business modeled in Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993), among others, and think of the endogenous opportunity cost of forgone equi-
librium wages/profits as the main determinant of entry/exit outcomes that arise from comparing
the expected present discounted value of each occupation.4
4Define the total income of an entrepreneur as TI = ra + z′f(k, z˜n) − wz˜n − (r + δ)k, and operating profits
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3.3 Recursive Formulation
At the stationary equilibrium, the problem of an agent who enters the period with the pair (a, z)
can be summarized by the value function
v(a, z) = max
{
vW (a, z), vE(a, z)
}
= max
{∑
z′
vW (a, z′)QW (z, z′),max
k,n
∑
z′
vE(a, z′)QE(z, z′)
}
, (4)
where the value for a worker and an entrepreneur, I ∈ {W,E}, respectively, equals
vI(a, z′) = max
c,a′
{u(c) + βv(a′, z′)}, (5)
subject to the occupation-specific budget constraints (1) or (3). Finally,
a ∈ A with a = 0, and k, n ≥ 0, (6)
Notice again that entrepreneurs must commit capital and labor inputs before the effective pro-
ductivity shock z′ is known. Note that it is optimal for an agent who decides to be a worker not
to take any loan.
3.4 Endogenous Financing Constraint
The specification of the Inada-type utility function together with the uncertainty in en-
trepreneurial profits imply that agents with a low level of accumulated assets may be constrained
with respect to the size of the entrepreneurial project. In particular, the total income must
guarantee a nonnegative consumption for all possible realizations of profit,
(1− δ)k + z′f(k, z˜n)− wz˜n− (1 + r)b ≥ 0 for all z′ ∈ Z. (7)
Assume that in each period QE(z, z) > 0 for all z ∈ Z and that z = 0. That is, the financing
constraint must be satisfied for the lowest effective ability shock z′ = 0,
(1− δ)k − wz˜n− (1 + r)b ≥ 0 for z′ = 0. (8)
Given these assumptions on the transition process QE , poor agents with good entrepreneurial
ideas may not be able to establish a firm or the firm size may be smaller than it would have been
without the financing constraint.5 For entrepreneurs with a high signal z, that is for those who
would like to borrow and hire many workers, the potential failure of the project might prevent
those with low savings to run a project at its efficient size. Furthermore, running a small firm
might decrease the expected profits below the opportunity cost of running the project in the first
place.6 Therefore, the financing constraint may have important allocation effects on entry and
especially on the firm size decisions.
from running the firm as OP = z′f(k, z˜n)− wz˜n− (r + δ)k.
5I set QE(z, z) > 0 for all z ∈ Z in each period only for a more intuitive interpretation of the financing
constraint and the analysis of leverage and private risk premia in Section 7. Similar results will hold and a
stationary equilibrium with an endogenous distribution of agents would also exist for QN (z, {z}) > 0 for all z ∈ Z
in a finite number of periods N > 0.
6The main opportunity cost is the forgone equilibrium wage from being a worker. The future value of a project
will be discussed in Section 7.
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Note that this constraint applies not only to borrowing but also to depositing entrepreneurs.
The financing constraint can also be motivated by limited contract enforceability.
3.5 Stationary equilibrium
At the aggregate level, the equilibrium outcome of these decisions is a probability measure λ that
determines the density over agents’ individual states (a, z), with a law of motion
λ′(a′, z′) =
∑
(a,z′):a′=a′(a,z′)
Q(z, z′)λ(a, z),
where a transition function Q(z, z′) ≡ QW (z, z′)|W + QE(z, z′)|E determines the end of period
productivity from the beginning of period productivity for each occupation. The measure of
agents with next period’s state (a′, z′) consists of agents whose skills evolve to z′ and whose
savings are a′.
3.6 Financial Intermediation
Financial intermediation consists of competitive banks that accept deposits and provide loans to
entrepreneurs. Total deposits from workers and depositing entrepreneurs are
D ≡
∑
E×W
max{0, a− k}λ(a, z),
and the aggregate loans taken by entrepreneurs are
L ≡
∑
E×W
max{0, k − a}λ(a, z) = L.
I assume banks lend to a perfectly diversified pool of entrepreneurs and that banks do not face
any risk so that their participation constraint is satisfied at zero profit. Banks have the capacity
to process and share information on agents over time.
3.7 Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The concept of stationary equilibria requires that assets supplied by all agents equal the amount
of capital demanded by the entrepreneurs, that labor supply by workers equal the labor hired by
entrepreneurs, and that all allocations be feasible for a time invariant probability measure.
Definition 1 A stationary recursive equilibrium with borrowing and lending is constant prices
(r, w), value functions (v, vW , vE), policy functions (k, n, c, a′), a probability measure λ, and ag-
gregate levels (A,K,D,L, Y, z˜), such that
1. at given prices the policy functions solve the optimization problem of each agent (a, z);
2. the probability measure λ is time invariant;
3. prices are such that markets clear: in particular, the financial market, D = L,
and the labor market, ∑
W
z′QW (z, z′)λ(a, z) = z˜
∑
E
n(a, z)λ(a, z),
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with ∑
W
λ(a, z) +
∑
E
λ(a, z) = 1;
4. the aggregate feasibility constraint holds at equality: for goods∑
{c(a, z′) + δa′(a, z′)}Q(z, z′)λ(a, z) =
∑
z′f(k(a, z), z˜n(a, z))QE(z, z′)λ(a, z) = Y,
and assets,
A =
∑
a λ(a, z) =
∑
E
k(a, z)λ(a, z) = K
4 Risk Sharing
Contracts that could reduce the riskiness of production and alleviate the financing constraint
might have important efficiency effects if they allow the more talented entrepreneurs to enter
and/or run their firms at a more efficient size. In this Section I describe a risk sharing contracts
for entrepreneurs under the assumption that all allocations are fully observable and contracts
fully enforceable.7 As the risk sharing contracts are actuarially fair, they are also provided by
the representative bank. Similarly to borrowing and lending, the risk sharing transfer technology
bears no cost.
An risk sharing contract allows entrepreneurs to insure against the risk represented by z′
by exchanging transfers from the bank that collects pooled profits from all entrepreneurs. En-
trepreneurs will be able to choose the degree of output uncertainty they want to bear. In partic-
ular, assume that the entrepreneur can write a risk sharing contract that will insure a fraction
of x ∈ [0, 1] of the difference between his realized output and the expected output. That is, the
entrepreneur (a, z) who uses inputs (k, n) and receives a productivity shock z′, sends to the bank
a risk-sharing transfer equal to
xf (k, z˜n)
(
z′ − E [z′|z]) .
A negative transfer represents an insurance transfer from the bank in the case of lower than
expected output, and vice versa. In the extreme cases, x = 0 represents no risk sharing as in the
previous Section while x = 1 represents full risk sharing where the entrepreneur receives transfers
that deliver the expected output in all states z′.
Denote the total transfer from the entrepreneur to the bank at the end of period after a shock
z′ is realized as
ρ(z′) = (1 + r)b+ xf(k, z˜n)
(
z′ − E[z′|z]) , (9)
where b is the amount of loan taken at the beginning of period.
The value function with risk sharing is
v(a, z) = max
∑
z′
vW (a, z′)QW (z, z′), max
x∈[0,1]
k,n
∑
z′
vE(a, z′)QE(z, z′)
 , (10)
subject to the occupational budget constraints (1) or (3) with the risk-sharing repayment ρ(z′)
for each z′ defined in equation (9). The endogenous financing constraint now becomes
(1− δ)k + (1− x)z′f(k, z˜n)− wz˜n− (1 + r)b+ xE[z′f(k, z˜n)|z] ≥ 0 for all z′ ∈ Z, (11)
7Default and imperfect monitoring will be analyzed in Sections 5 and 6.
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which is for the lowest shock,
(1− δ)k − wz˜n− (1 + r)b+ xE[z′f(k, z˜n)|z] ≥ 0 for z′ = z′ = 0. (12)
Compared to equation (8), the endogenous financing constraint is relaxed by the last term, the
insured fraction of the expected output. For choices x > 0 the financing constraint is less binding
than in the economy without risk sharing. In the case of full risk sharing, the entrepreneur faces
no output uncertainty and operates at the efficient scale. Since risk sharing is costless, x = 1 is
chosen in efficient allocations under full information. Detailed characterization of these allocation
will be provided in Section 7.
The definition of a stationary recursive equilibrium with risk sharing is the same except for
the added insurance decisions of entrepreneurs. With risk sharing, the representative bank now
intermediates credit between agents as well as provides insurance services.
5 Default
In this Section, the borrowing contract between an entrepreneur and a bank can be subject to
default on the loan repayment. I assume that a defaulting entrepreneur will have no access to
financial markets and risk sharing from the next period on. Also, it is assumed that wages of
workers are always honoured and that an entrepreneur defaults on the loan and subsequently
does not undertake any risk sharing transfer with the bank. Naturally, defaulted entrepreneurs
do not have access to risk-sharing transfers.
The value of being (already) forever in default is
vD(a, z) = max
{∑
z′
vDW (a, z′)QW (z, z′),max
k,n
∑
z′
vDE(a, z′)QE(z, z′)
}
, (D)
where the value for a previously defaulted worker and an entrepreneur, I ∈ {W,E}, respectively,
equals
vDI(a, z′) = max
c,a′
{u(c) + βvD(a′, z′)}, (13)
subject to the budget constraints for a worker in default
c+ a′ ≤ (1− δ)a+ wz′, (14)
or a budget constraint for an entrepreneur in default,
c+ a′ ≤ (1− δ)a+ z′f(k, z˜n)− wz˜n, (15)
and an exclusion from financial markets constraint
k ≤ a and x = 0. (16)
In equilibrium, there will be no default. In preventing default, the contract must satisfy an
incentive constraint where the present discounted value of honoring the contract is greater or
equal than the present discounted value of defaulting. The gain from default is the current gain
from a lower loan repayment; the cost is the present discounted value of being excluded from the
financial market from the next period on.
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Note that default applies only to borrowers with b > 0. Let γ ∈ [0, 1) denote the fraction of
the loan the bank recovers. If γ = 0, there is a full default.
For all (a, z) and each x(a, z) ∈ [0, 1], the repudiation constraint is an allocation
(k(a, z), n(a, z)) such that for each realization of z′ ∈ Z,
vE(a, z′) ≥ max
cˆ,aˆ′
{
u(cˆ) + βvD(aˆ′, z′)
}
, (17)
subject to a budget constraint
cˆ+ aˆ′ ≤ (1− δ)k + z′f(k, z˜n)− wz˜n− ρD, (18)
with ρD = γ(1 + r)b.
Definition 2 (One-Period Gain from Default) For a borrowing entrepreneur characterized
by (a, z), the one-period gain from defaulting is
∆D = (1− γ)(1 + r)b(a, z) > 0.
For derivation see Appendix. The current period gain from defaulting is positive as the en-
trepreneur repays only a part of the loan that the bank can recover. Note there is no gain from
risk-sharing transfers that are zero in expectation when shocks (z, z′) are reported truthfully. As
the gain from default is decreasing in the size of a loan, the bank will tend to provide smaller loans
in order to provide default-free contracts in equilibrium. Again, the default constraint would be
likely more binding on poor agents and high-skill agents, both with high leverage.8
5.0.1 Ex-Ante Default
An entrepreneur can also default ex-ante, that is keeping the borrowed capital only for consump-
tion, not producing, and repaying only a fraction of the loan ρD = γ(1 + r)b. For all (a, z) and
x ∈ [0, 1], the repudiation constraint is an allocation (k, n) such that
vE(a, z) = max
k,n
∑
z′
vE(a, z′)QE(z, z′) ≥ max
cˆ,aˆ′
{
u(cˆ) + vD(aˆ′, z)
}
, (ex ante-D)
subject to a budget constraint
cˆ+ aˆ′ ≤ (1− δ)k − ρD. (19)
Note that there is no uncertainty. It is assumed that no production is followed by z′ = z in the
next period.
Definition 3 (One-Period Gain from Ex-Ante Default) For a borrowing entrepreneur
characterized by (a, z), the one-period gain from defaulting ex-ante is
E[∆DEA|z] = (1− γ)(1 + r)b(a, z)− (E[z′|z]f(k(a, z), z˜n(a, z))− wz˜n(a, z)) .
8In a different setup it might be Pareto superior to allow for optimal default in bad circumstances to default as
in Dubey et al. (2005)).
12
For derivation see Appendix. The one-period gain from defaulting ex-ante is ∆D minus the loss
of expected output less wages paid to workers.
6 Imperfect Monitoring
Private information on entrepreneurial productivity constrains efficient allocation of resources
available under full risk sharing. When z is unobservable at all times, in order to assure truthful
reporting, the bank specifies a contract consisting of a threat-keeping constraint needed for a
true report of the signal shock z and an incentive constraint required for a truthful report of
the realized shock z′. In equilibrium, there will only be truthful reports at the cost of imperfect
insurance and sub-optimal allocation of capital.
6.1 Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility Constraint
The ex-post, incentive constraint for a truthful report of z′ is specified first. For an entrepreneur
with assets a, true initial signal shock z, who was assigned inputs (k(a, z), n(a, z)) and risk-
sharing x(a, z), and who later realized a true realization of output based on z′ but contemplates
reporting a shock realization zˆ′(z′), the incentive compatibility constraint requires that for all
(a, z) ∈ A× Z, and all true z′ ∈ Z,
u(c) + βv(a′, z′; z′) ≥ max
cˆ,aˆ′
{
u(cˆ) + βvˆ(aˆ′, z′; zˆ′)
}
for each zˆ′ ∈ Z, (IC)
where the right-hand side maximization is subject to the budget constraint
cˆ+ aˆ′ ≤ (1− δ)k + z′f(k, z˜n)− wz˜n− ρ(zˆ′),
where
ρ(zˆ′) = (1 + r)b+ x
(
zˆ′f(k, z˜n)− E [z′f(k, z˜n)|z]) = (1 + r)b+ xf(k, z˜n) (zˆ′ − E [z′|z]) .
Note that the endogenous financing constraint remains the same as in equation (12) for the same
choice of risk sharing and inputs.
Denote the choice of zˆ′ that maximizes the value of ex-post reporting as
zˆ′(z′) ≡ arg max
zˆ′∈Z
max
cˆ,aˆ′
{
u(cˆ) + βvˆ(aˆ′, z′; zˆ′)
}
for all z′ ∈ Z.
Truthful reporting requires that zˆ′(z′) = z′ for all z′ ∈ Z.
6.2 Ex-Ante Threat-Keeping Constraint (Adverse Selection)
The ex-ante, threat-keeping constraint represents an adverse selection problem. The constraint
requires that the allocations are based on a reported shock zˆ when the true shock is z. For an
entrepreneur with assets a, true shock z, and misreported shock zˆ carried over from the last period,
let vˆE(a, z; zˆ) denote the present discounted value of being assigned inputs (kˆ = k(a, z; zˆ), nˆ =
n(a, z; zˆ)) with risk-sharing xˆ = x(a, z; zˆ),
vˆE(a, z; zˆ) ≡ max
xˆ∈[0,1]
kˆ,nˆ
∑
z′
max
cˆ,aˆ′
{
u(cˆ) + βv(aˆ′, z′; z′)
}
QE(z, z′), (TK)
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subject to
cˆ+ aˆ′ ≤ (1− δ)kˆ + z′f(kˆ, z˜nˆ)− wz˜nˆ− ρˆ(z′),
where
ρˆ(z′) = (1 + r)bˆ+ xˆ
(
z′f(kˆ, z˜nˆ)− E
[
z′f(kˆ, z˜nˆ)|zˆ
])
= (1 + r)bˆ+ xˆf(kˆ, z˜nˆ)
(
z′ − E [z′|zˆ]) .
Note that the true value v(aˆ′, z′; z′) on the right-hand side of (TK) is due to the incentive com-
patibility constraint (IC) applied to the one-period deviation from the current period onwards in
the recursive formulation above, i.e., when z′ = zˆ′(z′).
The endogenous financing constraint for the lowest realization of output z′ = 0 is
(1− δ)kˆ − wz˜nˆ− (1 + r)bˆ+ xˆf(kˆ, z˜nˆ)E[z′|zˆ] ≥ 0.
6.3 Truth-Telling Incentive Compatibility Contract
The incentive compatible contract must jointly include the threat-keeping constraint (TK, ad-
verse selection) and the incentive compatibility constraint (IC), otherwise the agent would have
incentives to deviate in either subperiod.
Finally, the adverse selection constraint must also guarantee that the contract is incentive
compatible for those entrepreneurs who would choose to become workers for whom vˆW (a, z; zˆ) =
vW (a, z) as wages are paid for each realization of z′ without any risk sharing.
Together, truth-telling requires for all (a, z) ∈ A× Z and all zˆ ∈ Z,
v(a, z) ≥ vˆ(a, z; zˆ) = max{vˆE(a, z; zˆ), vW (a, z)} ,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) and threat-keeping (TK) constraints.
6.4 One-Period Gain from Imperfect Monitoring
For an (a, z)-entrepreneur contemplating deviations from truthful reporting it is possible to derive
one-period gains from reporting any combinations (zˆ, zˆ′) ∈ Z × Z. Note that these are out-of-
equilibrium allocations that can be nevertheless evaluated at equilibrium prices.
These gains can be decomposed into three parts. First is the loss in expected profits E[∆pi|z]
from reporting a different signal zˆ than the true signal shock z. This loss arises from suboptimal
inputs (k(a, zˆ), n(a, zˆ)) assigned to to correct expectations based on the true signal shock z in the
decreasing-returns production function. A suboptimal inputs lead to a lower expected profit
E[∆pi|z] ≡ E[pi(k(a, zˆ), n(a, zˆ))|z]− E[pi(k(a, z), n(a, z))|z] < 0.
In an example depicted in Figure 2, the agent has a low signal shock zL and contemplates reporting
a higher signal shock zH . For the true signal zL, a capital stock k(zL) maximizes expected profits
E[pi(k(zL))|zL], and similarly for the high shock. The expected loss in profits from misreporting
zH > zL is E[∆pi].
Positive gains from imperfect monitoring arise from positive risk-sharing transfers in expec-
tation: from misreporting the ex-ante signal z and/or the ex-post effective shock z′. Reporting a
higher signal shock zˆ > z delivers higher ex-ante, expected risk-sharing transfers. This gain arises
from the adverse selection problem where the increasing, monotone QE-transition process implies
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Figure 2: Expected Profit and Imperfect Monitoring
E[z′|zˆ] ≥ E[z′|z], that is a higher probability of realized output for which the entrepreneurs
expects risk-sharing transfers from the bank,
x(a, zˆ)f(k(a, zˆ), n(a, zˆ))
(
E
[
z′|zˆ]− E [z′|z]) > 0.
The ex-post gains arise from reporting zˆ′(z′) < z′, that is directly manipulating the risk-
sharing transfers ex-post, and in expectation,
x(a, zˆ)f(k(a, zˆ), n(a, zˆ))E
[
z′ − zˆ′(z′)|z] > 0.
Note that for all three cases the agent forms the correct expectation based on the true signal
shock z.
Definition 4 (One-Period Gain from Imperfect Monitoring) For an entrepreneur char-
acterized by (a, z), the one-period gain from reporting any (zˆ, zˆ′) ∈ Z × Z is
E[∆|z] = E[∆pi|z] + xˆf(kˆ, z˜nˆ) (E [z′|zˆ]− E [z′|z])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex−Ante
+ xˆf(kˆ, z˜nˆ)E
[
z′ − zˆ′(z′)|z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex−Post
,
where
E[∆pi|z] = E[z′|z](f(kˆ, z˜nˆ)− f(k, z˜n))− wz˜(nˆ− n)− (r + δ)(kˆ − k) < 0.
For derivation see Appendix. Note that the gain applies to both borrowing and depositing
entrepreneurs, i.e. all entrepreneurs with positive risk-sharing.
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In equilibrium with truthful reporting, it must be that the one-period gains from imperfect
monitoring are dominated by the value of long-term losses.
6.5 Default together with Imperfect Monitoring
When defaulting is an option together with the imperfect monitoring problem the incentive
compatibility constraint (IC) for each ex-post realization shock z′ must also hold for the possibility
of default, for all (a, z) ∈ A× Z, and all z′ ∈ Z,
u(c) + βv(a′, z′) ≥ max
cˆ,aˆ′
{
u(cˆ) + βvD(aˆ′, z′)
}
, (D-IC)
where the right-hand side maximization is subject to the same budget constraint as in equation
(18). As risk-sharing transfers are also provided by the bank, it is assumed that default must
occur before risk-sharing transfers take place.
Definition 5 (One-Period Gain from Imperfect Monitoring and Default) For a bor-
rowing entrepreneur characterized by (a, z), the one-period gain from imperfect monitoring and
default for any (zˆ, zˆ′) ∈ Z × Z is
E[∆D|z] = (1− γ)(1 + r)bˆ− E[∆pi|z],
where
E[∆pi|z] = E[z′|z](f(kˆ, z˜nˆ)− f(k, z˜n))− wz˜(nˆ− n)− (r + δ)(kˆ − k) < 0.
For derivation see Appendix. The loss comes again from the lower profits in expectation E[∆pi|z]
while the gain arises from the defaulted part of the loan b(a, zˆ). Note that there is no loss from
risk-sharing transfers that are not provided to defaulting entrepreneurs.
6.6 Ex-Ante Default together with Imperfect Monitoring
When imperfect monitoring is combined with the possibility of ex-ante default, the threat-keeping
constraint (TK) must hold also for the value of reporting a different signal zˆ and defaulting
immediately without using the inputs (k(a, zˆ), n(a, zˆ)) in production.
For all (a, z, zˆ), the threat-keeping (TK) and repudiation (ex ante-D) constraints together are
vˆE(a, z; zˆ) ≥ max
cˆ,aˆ′
{
u(cˆ) + vD(aˆ′, z)
}
, (D-TK)
subject to a budget constraint
cˆ+ aˆ′ ≤ (1− δ)kˆ − ρˆD,
with ρˆD = γ(1 + r)bˆ.
As risk-sharing is also provided by the bank, it is assumed that there are no risk-sharing
transfers if there is a default.
Definition 6 (One-Period Gain from Imperfect Monitoring and Ex-Ante Default)
For a borrowing entrepreneur characterized by (a, z), the one-period gain from one imperfect
monitoring and ex-ante default for any zˆ ∈ ZZ is
E[∆D−EA|z] = (1− γ)(1 + r)bˆ− (r + δ)(bˆ− b)− (E[z′|z]f(k, z˜n)− wz˜n) .
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For derivation see Appendix. The gain from ex-ante default and adverse selection of reporting
zˆ is the gain from not repaying the assigned loan less the loan repayment on the difference with
respect to the loan based on true signal, minus the loss from unrealized production. Note that
there is no loss from risk-sharing transfers that are not provided to defaulting entrepreneurs.
6.7 The Economy without Financial Intermediation
Finally, I include a description of an economy without financial intermediation. In financial
autarky, there is no financial intermediation (interest rate does not exist) and for all agents b = 0.
Without financial sector, there is no possibility of risk sharing (and therefore, there is no space
for imperfect monitoring). Therefore, each entrepreneur must finance his or her project from
accumulated assets and faces full risk from volatile production. Otherwise, the structure of the
this economy is identical. In particular, there still exists a labor market where workers can be
hired at an equilibrium wage w and entrepreneurs have access to the same production technology.
A worker now faces a budget constraint
c+ a′ ≤ (1− δ)a+ wz′.
Without financial intermediation, entrepreneurs must satisfy k ≤ a. It is easy to show that it is
always optimal to use all assets in production and adjust the number of workers. An entrepreneur
has a budget constraint
c+ a′ ≤ (1− δ)a+ z′f(a, z˜n)− wz˜n.
The financing constraint can be written, for z′ = z = 0,
(1− δ)a− wz˜n ≥ 0.
The definition of the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is similar to that of the economy
with financial intermediation except for the market clearing condition in the asset market. If the
equilibrium exists, i.e., if there is a positive fraction of workers (entrepreneurs), the total amount
of capital used in production is strictly smaller than the total amount of assets in the economy,
K < A.
7 Characterization of Entrepreneurial Decisions
This Section characterizes the optimal allocations by entrepreneurs. Because productivity shocks
multiply the production function and it is the only source of uncertainty, there is an optimal
capital-labor ratio for depositors and borrowers independent of assets or productivity shock z,
provided that the exogenous collateral does not bind.
Proposition 1 (Capital-Labor Ratio) If the collateral constraint does not bind, the optimal
capital-labor ratio equals
χ ≡ k
n
=
(
α
1− α
)(
wz˜
r + δ
)
,
where r and w are the equilibrium prices.
The proof follows directly from the first order conditions.
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Proposition 2 (Risk Sharing with Full Information) In an economy with full information,
the optimal risk sharing is x(a, z) = 1 for all (a, z).
This results follows directly from the first order condition for the choice of risk sharing derived
in the Appendix.
Intuitively, as the degree of risk sharing at an individual entrepreneur’s level is costless, the
optimal decision for risk averse entrepreneurs is to fully insure the profit of the firm. Therefore,
in the risk sharing economy with full information, the entrepreneurs do not face any risk and the
financing constraint is never binding.
7.1 Endogenous Bounds on Leverage
Definition 7 (Leverage Ratio) Leverage is the the ratio of assets to equity, that is, the ratio
of an entrepreneur’s own assets plus debt over assets,
φ(a, z) ≡ a+ b(a, z)
a
=
k(a, z)
a
.
The bank for provides incentive compatible contracts by restricting risk-sharing and limiting
the amount of the loan. The incentive compatible truth-telling contract can be expressed in terms
of a maximum leverage ratio.
Definition 8 (Collateral Constraint) For an entrepreneur characterized by (a, z), and for
each choice of risk sharing x(a, z) ∈ [0, 1],
φ(a, z) ≤ κ(a, z) with κ > 1. (20)
For depositing entrepreneurs, the collateral constraint does not bind as k < a. For depositing
entrepreneurs subject to imperfect monitoring, the only instrument the bank has is to limit the
amount of risk sharing. For each (a, z), the Lagrange multiplier η on the collateral constraint can
be used for the analysis of risk premia and allocation of capital across firms.
The endogenous financing constraint also imposes an upper bound on the leverage. Using
the optimal capital-labor ratio we get the following Proposition for the upper bound on leverage
derived from the maximum level of capital satisfying the financing constraint.
Proposition 3 (Leverage Bound) For a borrowing entrepreneur (a, z) with risk sharing
x(a, z) ∈ [0, 1], the upper bound on leverage is
φ(a, z) = min
{
κ(a, z),
α(1 + r)
r + δ
(
1 + x(a, z)
E[z′|z]f(k(a, z), z˜n(a, z))
(1 + r)a
)}
. (21)
The upper bound on leverage comes either from the exogenous collateral constraint or from
the endogenous financing constraint. The latter is decreasing in the equilibrium interest rate as a
higher interest rate makes borrowing more costly which in turn might lead to a binding financing
constraint.
Risk sharing x(a, z) increases the right-hand term by guaranteeing income that can be used
as collateral in the worst state when production is zero. This term represents the expected
output over the gross return on assets. The upper bound on leverage is a function of wealth,
expected output, parameters and equilibrium interest rate on loans. Without risk sharing, that
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is when x = 0, the upper bound on leverage is independent of assets and is non-increasing in the
equilibrium interest rate, ∂φ∂r < 0. For the usual values of the parameters (α, δ) and the equilibrium
loan rate r, α(1 + r)/(r + δ)  1, so that the maximum level of capital as a function of assets
lies above the 45-degree line.
The leverage bound also implies the minimal amount of down-payment on a loan, the margin,
defined as m = 1− b/k, i.e. one minus the loan-to-value ratio.
Corrolary 1 (Collateral Margin Bound) For a borrowing entrepreneur (a, z), the lower
bound on collateral margin is
m(a, z) = φ(a, z)−1. (22)
7.2 Private Equity Premium
Financing and collateral constraints also imply private equity premia. For a simpler exposition,
the marginal capital product is denoted fk ≡ fk(k, z˜n) and the expected marginal utility of
consumption E[uc(c)|z] = E[uc(c(a, z′))|z].
Proposition 4 (Private Equity Premium) For a borrowing entrepreneur characterized by
(a, z), the private equity premium is
E[z′|z]fk − r − δ = η
E[uc(c)|z] − (1− x)
cov (uc(c), z
′fk)
E[uc(c)|z] , (23)
where η is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the collateral constraint.
The private equity premium defines the extra return earned on the marginal investment into
the business project instead of depositing it in the bank. The right-hand side consists of two
non-negative terms: the first term represents the wedge related to the collateral constraint (repre-
senting the incentive constraints), the second term is the premium compensating the entrepreneur
for the idiosyncratic risk of the business project (note that the covariance term is negative). The
premium increases in the severity of the collateral constraint and in riskiness of the project. The
private equity premium is derived in the Appendix. With risk sharing, the idiosyncratic risk of
the project is lower by the insured part of the risk through risk sharing.
With full information and full risk sharing, both the financing and the collateral constraints
are never binding and the private equity premium equals zero, E[z′|z]fk − r − δ = 0.
7.3 Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
Convergence in sets as in Abreu et al. (1986) and Abreu et al. (1990).
Continuation values (v′, vD) ∈ V × V into v ∈ V . Continuation value functions must be
admissible with respect to the set of value functions, (v′, vD) ∈ W , Admissible allocations map
candidate continuation values tomorrow into new candidate values today, B(W ). The operator
B is monotone, if W ⊆ W ′ ⊆ R then B(W ) ⊆ B(W ′). B(·) maps compact sets W into compact
sets B(W ). W is self-generating if W ⊆ B(W ). If W ⊂ R is bounded and self-generating, then
B(W ) ⊆ V . With V ⊆ B(V ) , self-generation implies V = B(V ), the set of equilibrium values is
the largest fixed point of B. Monotonicity and compactness allow iteration on B to convergence
from a large initial set V ⊆ B(W0) ⊆W0.
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7.4 Existence of Equilibrium
The occupational choice of an agent is based on the comparison of the expected present discounted
value of each career. The following two assumptions guarantee the existence of a stationary
recursive equilibrium with a positive fraction of the population in each occupation.
Assumption 1 The signal ability shock z is such that there exists an asset level as for which∑
z′
vW (a, z′)QW (z, z′) ≤
∑
z′
vE(a, z′)QE(z, z′) for all a ≥ as.
Assumption 2 The signal ability shock z is such that∑
z′
vW (a, z′)QW (z, z′) ≥
∑
z′
vE(a, z′)QE(z, z′) for all a ∈ A.
Both assumptions are related to the opportunity cost of each occupation. The first assumption
requires that there be a shock sufficiently high so that agents with assets greater than a switching
level as become entrepreneurs: the expected value of entrepreneurship is greater than the ex-
pected value of choosing to work for a wage. Vice versa, the second assumption requires a shock
sufficiently low so that agents with such a signal prefer to be workers.
The properties of value functions for each occupation follow the analysis in Bohacek (2006) and
Stokey et al. (1989). The value function of each occupation, vI(a, z′), is strictly increasing in each
argument since the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly concave and a the constraint
set is strictly increasing in assets and the effective ability shock. Due to the monotonicity of
the transition matrix Q, the expected value functions of each occupations and the value function
v(a, z) are all increasing and continuous functions of both a and z.9
7.5 Future Value of Entrepreneurship
The experience aspect contained in the monotone Markov process has important implications for
the investment decisions of entering entrepreneurs. Contrary to the static model in Lucas (1978),
where agents only consider the current expected incomes, it is the expected discounted present
value of each career that determines an agent’s occupational decision.
For a given level of signal ability shock z ∈ Z, an agent with assets at the switching level as(z)
is indifferent between working and undertaking an entrepreneurial project. Therefore, it must be
the case that ∑
z′
vW (as(z), z′)QW (z, z′) =
∑
z′
vE(as(z), z′)QE(z, z′). (24)
The first order intertemporal condition for any asset level a and any realized effective ability
shock z′ is just uc(c(a, z′)) = βva(a′(a, z′), z′) as there is no uncertainty about the agent’s next
period state. Using the usual envelope conditions and assuming interior solutions, the condition
(24) can be rewritten, dropping the term (1 + r)β on both sides, as∑
z′
va(a
′(as(z), z′), z′)QW (z, z′) =
∑
z′
va(a
′(as(z), z′), z′)QE(z, z′).
9The value function v(a, z)—the outer envelope for the value functions at each shock level—may not be a
concave function even if the value functions of workers and entrepreneurs are. Gomes et al. (2001) analyze a model
of unemployment with a similar property. The operator on the value function satisfies the Blackwell’s sufficient
conditions for a contraction mapping. In this paper, we do not explore possible gains from randomization.
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Entrepreneurship has a future value if the transition process QE is sufficiently persistent,∑
z′ z
′QW (z, z′) <
∑
z′ z
′QE(z, z′). In other words, the marginal entrepreneurs are willing to
sacrifice current consumption for having the opportunity to begin their business career that brings
high returns only in the future. They invest a large share of their income and wealth in order to
relax the credit constraint and to run their firm at the optimal size. For such agents the expected
current income from business might be lower than the current expected wage. Without full risk
sharing, the financing constraint might prevent the entrepreneur from running the firm at the
optimal size and the above inequality might hold for several initial periods of entrepreneurship.10
7.6 TFP and Wedges
Definition 9 (TFP Measure) The total factor productivity is measured as the ratio of output
in the entrepreneurial economy to a corresponding output of a representative agent, constant
returns to scale economy, using the same aggregate inputs in both economies,
Ψ =
Y
Ks(z˜N)1−s
where s = wz˜N/Y. (25)
The input shares in the CRS production function are defined as the labor income share in output
in the entrepreneurial economy.
Wedges represent the credit market frictions as distortions in first-order conditions and re-
source constraints (see Chari et al. (2007)). For an economy with frictions (default or asymmetric
information), the collateral constraint becomes binding for some agents. The positive Lagrange
multiplier can be represented by a tax on the distorted allocations. The tax is such that the
first-order conditions hold at zero Lagrange multiplier again. All wedges are evaluated at corre-
sponding equilibrium prices. A zero wedge applies to entrepreneurs who do not face a binding
collateral constraint.
Definition 10 (Intertemporal Wedge τI) The intertemporal wedge τI ∈ [0, 1) is a subsidy on
savings such that the first order intertemporal condition for an economy with frictions is for each
(a, z′),
uc(c(a, z
′))(1− τI(a, z′)) = (1 + r)βE[uc(c′(a′, z′′))|z′]. (26)
In the budget constraint, the subsidy on savings (1− τI) represents the incentives needed to save
sufficient assets such that the collateral constraint is not binding in the next period. The subsidy
equals
τI(a, z
′) = 1− (1 + r)βE[uc(c
′(a′, z′′))|z′]
uc(c(a, z′))
. (27)
The aggregate investment wedge is
τ¯I =
∑
a,z
τI(a, z
′)QE(z, z′)λ(a, z).
Definition 11 (Capital Wedge τK) The capital wedge τK ∈ [0, 1) is a tax rate on the cost of
capital input that makes the collateral constraint not binding for each (a, z),
E
[
uc(c(a, z
′))
(
z′fk(k(a, z), z˜n(a, z))− (r + δ)(1 + τK(a, z))
) |z] = 0. (28)
10In the search model with occupational choice by Gomes et al. (2001), consumption of searchers similarly
decreases compared to workers who keep their jobs.
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Discount factor β 0.95
Risk aversion σ 1.00
Span of control θ 0.88
Depreciation rate δ 0.043
Capital share α 0.32
Loan recovery rate γ 0.75
Productivity shocks
Entrepreneurs QE ρE = 0.90 σE = 0.50
Workers QW ρW = 0.94 σW = 0.20
Levels∗ z= { 0.00, 1.00, 1.25, 1.50, 1.75, 2.00, 2.25, 2.50 }
Notes: ρ = serial correlation, σ = standard deviation. ∗Workers’ lowest ability shock z = 0.5.
As η is reduced to zero, the tax on capital input must make the capital more costly so that the
input is not increased. The aggregate capital wedge is
τ¯K =
∑
a,z
τK(a, z)λ(a, z).
Definition 12 (Efficiency Wedge τY ) The efficiency wedge τY ∈ [0, 1) is a tax rate
E
[
z′f(k∗(a, z), z˜n∗(a, z))|z] (1− τY (a, z)) = E [z′f(k(a, z), z˜n(a, z))|z] , (29)
where k∗(a, z) and n∗(a, z) are the efficient capital and labor inputs that satisfy for each (a, z),
E
[
z′fk(k∗(a, z), z˜n∗(a, z))|z
]− (r + δ) = 0,
E
[
z′fn(k∗(a, z), z˜n∗(a, z))|z
]− z˜w = 0.
The efficiency wedge relates the chosen inputs (k(a, z), n(a, z)) to the efficient capital and labor
inputs (k∗(a, z), n∗(a, z)) that are constrained neither by the financing nor the collateral con-
straint. In other words, the inputs (k∗(a, z), n∗(a, z)) represent the optimal size of the firm at
equilibrium prices.11 The aggregate efficiency wedge is
τ¯Y =
∑
a,z
τY (a, z)λ(a, z).
8 Results
This Section presents the results of numerical simulations of four stationary equilibria of the
economy with risk sharing, default and asymmetric information, and in autarky.
8.1 Parameters
Parameters of the model are shown in Table 1 are standard for the U. S. economy as in Cooley
(1995). The span of managerial control θ set at 0.88, a level close to the one estimated by Burnside
(1996). The utility has the logarithmic form.
11Because of the decreasing returns to scale, the wedge on the optimal size of the firm can be found from
k∗(a, z)(1− τF (a, z)) = k(a, z).
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Table 2: Aggregate Allocations: Benchmark Economies with Zero Margins
Risk Sharing Autarky
Full Information Imperfect Monitoring
— Default — Default —
Entrep. (%) 8.43 8.64 8.81 9.12 9.71
Assets 3.72 3.73 4.11 4.03 5.15
Capital 4.18
Output 1.17 1.16 1.11 1.04 0.94
Consumption 1.01 1.01 0.95 0.87 0.78
r (%) 4.58 4.24 2.52 2.12 —
w 1.43 1.41 1.23 1.09 0.79
K/Y 3.17 3.20 3.69 3.87 4.43
L/GDP 2.62 2.36 1.58 1.22 —
TFP 1.40 1.38 1.17 1.07 0.81
Leverage 11.32 4.81 2.08 1.51 —
Margin (%) 18.80 24.98 50.77 67.30 —
PEP (%) 8.52 0.09 0.27 1.20 —
Wedge (%)
Intertemporal 0.00 2.09 6.10 5.77 8.60
Efficiency 0.00 19.51 60.20 62.38 40.58
Firm Size 0.00 21.52 63.65 65.49 41.64
Welfare 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.86 0.77
Entrepreneurs 1.51 1.75 2.78 3.25 3.41
Workers 0.94 0.92 0.75 0.65 0.48
Notes: Assets and capital are equal in all economies except autarky. L/GDP equals total credit (loans)
over output. Welfare measured in terms of consumption equivalent units.
The transition matrix for entrepreneurial skills has important implications for the degree of
business persistence and accumulation of wealth by business families. I set the values of QE and
the levels of shocks Z so that the model is able to replicate the first and second moments of the
U.S. distribution of wealth. I set the serial correlation parameter ρE at 0.90 in the benchmark
calibration as in Covas (2006). In the following section of the paper I will study different per-
sistence processes of entrepreneurial skills. The unconditional standard deviation σE is set to
match the first two moments of the U.S. distribution of wealth and income discussed in Section
2. I find that σE = 0.5, which implies a much riskier process that of workers (see Covas (2006),
Hamilton (2000) and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). Similarly to Veracierto (2001),
I choose the effective ability shocks for the entrepreneurs Z = [0, z] with QE(0, 0) = 1 so that
an entrepreneur who fails with the lowest effective ability shock will prefer to be a worker in
the following period. Also, QE(z, 0) > 0 for all z ∈ Z implies that all entrepreneurs terminate
their businesses in finite time. The zero output probabilities entries in the transition matrix are
calculated using annualized data from Table 1 in Evans (1987) on growth rates and exit rates of
firms in the Small Business Data Base constructed by the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA).
Workers draw z′ from a first-order Markov process QW (z, z′), approximated by the method
of Tauchen and Hussey (1991), with the AR(1) coefficient ρW = 0.94 and the unconditional
standard deviation σW = 0.20, which is in the range of estimates in the literature (see Hubbard
et al. (1994), Storesletten et al. (2004), and Covas (2006)). The lowest possible value of their
productivity shock is set to 0.5. This specification of shocks and their laws of motion imposes the
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financing constraint in each period and satisfies the assumptions on the existence of a stationary
equilibrium. I use the standard method of Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to approximate both
processes by a Markov process with eight states.
Productivity parameters are specified so that the outcomes in the financial intermediation
economy match the data for the U.S. economy, with entrepreneurs constituting 8-10% of the
population and the average exit rate is around 5% (see Evans (1987)). The discount factor and
depreciation rate lead to capital-output ratios equal to 3.17 in the risk sharing steady state.
8.2 Default Recovery Rates
The important parameter for bank loan recovery is calibrated to γ = 0.75. This level was used
by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and corresponds to the following U.S. statistics: the median
recovery rate of 72% for senior bank loans in Moody’s 1970-2000; discounted average recovery
rates for senior bank loans 88.3% in S&P 1981-2000; nominal average recovery rates for senior
bank loans of 77.1% in S&P 1981-2000; Fitch 2001 senior secured bank loans recovery of 73%;
or Fitch 1991-1997 bank loans of 82%. Altman 1996-2001 bank loans: 60-86%. Altman (1984)
estimates the sum of direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy at 20%.
8.3 Numerical Simulation
The algorithm for finding the steady state of each regime is relatively simple. To solve for the
occupational decision, expected values of both options are computed first. I iterate on the wage
and the interest rates (and insurance payments) until markets are cleared, banks have zero profit
and the conditions of the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium are satisfied. Finally, I set
the maximal level of assets high enough so that the upper bound of the stationary distribution
of resources is endogenous. Convergence in sets is accommodated by starting with much higher
initial guess of the value function than that in default (see Abreu et al. (1986) and Abreu et al.
(1990)).
8.4 Steady State Aggregate Allocations
Table 2 shows the aggregate steady-state results for all simulated economies. Results are compared
to the first column describing the efficient allocation with risk sharing and full information.
Frictions in the financial market increase the need for accumulating assets that are required
to be held as collateral. All assets are used in production except for autarky, where almost 20%
of assets lie idle. Output and consumption fall significantly (by around 8-15%) in economies with
imperfect monitoring. Fraction of entrepreneurs is 8.43% and generally increases with frictions. It
falls bellow this number only in autarky and the economy without risk sharing and with default.
General equilibrium effects are extremely important. In the full risk sharing economy, the
optimal allocation of capital to skills increases demand for capital, which increases the interest
rate and especially wages. Prices fall to much lower levels with frictions, up to 2.5% for interest
rate and by more than 25% for wages (in autarky, wages fall by more than 50%). Correspondingly,
the capital-output ratio increases and the ratio of credit to GDP falls.
Efficiency measures are presented at the bottom. TFP measures based on the constant return
to scale equivalent show large losses related to imperfect monitoring, contrary to Hopenhayn
(2011) and Midrigan and Xu (2010) who argue that financial market frictions are unlikely to
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Table 3: Median Entrepreneurs: Benchmark Economies with Zero Margins
Risk Sharing Autarky
Full Information Imperfect Monitoring
— Default — Default —
Assets 5.25 8.75 20.50 24.00 23.54
Capital 41.75 40.89 40.27 36.51 23.51
Risk Sharing 1.00 1.00 0.26 0.14 —
Output 13.19 12.91 10.97 9.73 5.80
Income 1.83 2.39 2.98 3.01 2.71
Profit 1.58 2.01 2.46 2.49 2.71
Return (%) 3.79 4.79 5.87 6.64 11.54
MPK 8.52 8.49 7.33 7.18 6.71
Leverage 7.26 4.59 2.03 1.55 —
Margin (%) 13.76 21.74 49.21 64.53 —
PEP (%) 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.87 —
Wedge (%)
Intertemporal 0.00 1.88 2.11 2.38 7.08
Efficiency 0.00 21.98 53.64 59.69 49.76
Firm Size 0.00 24.34 57.83 63.36 50.85
Assets/Income 2.87 3.67 6.87 7.98 8.68
imply large efficiency losses in an economy with relatively efficient capital markets. Also wedges
required to eliminate market frictions are sizeable, at around 60%.
These effects have large effect on welfare, opposite for each occupation (computed as con-
sumption equivalents). Default in combination with information asymmetries lowers welfare by
7-14%. As frictions increase the rent to entrepreneurs, their welfare increase dramatically, while
the welfare of workers falls by 25-40%. In autarky, these changes are even more dramatic. As in
Geanakoplos and Fostel (2012), workers suffer welfare losses from low wages inefficient production.
8.5 Entrepreneurs
Table 3 shows allocations of the median entrepreneur (that is, the median firm). The risk-sharing
economy with full information allocates capital to entrepreneurs with highest skills regardless
of their assets. Entrepreneurs do not need to have a buffer stock of assets, output is higher,
and return lower than in other economies. Efficient allocation of resources to talent increases
equilibrium prices and reduces income and profit of entrepreneurs.
In the risk-sharing steady-state, leverage is 7.26, corresponding to a 14% collateral margin,
and it decreases to 2 in the imperfect monitoring steady state. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013)
find mean values of leverage for large non-financial listed U.S. firms to be very stable at around
2.3-2.4 and slightly larger for non-listed firms. In the 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances
the average leverage 2.85.
Absence of full risk sharing in economies with default and information frictions require all
agents to accumulate more assets for self-insurance and collateral requirements that enable them
to borrow if they become entrepreneurs. Leverage is much smaller, collateral margins increase to
22% with default and to 49% with imperfect monitoring. If combined with default, margins are
at 64%. Median private equity premium is between 0 and 1%. Covas (2006) generates an average
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Table 4: Distribution of Assets and Income
Risk Sharing Autarky
Full Information Imperfect Monitoring
— Default — Default —
Inequality (Gini)
Income 0.24 0.26 0.36 0.39 0.51
Wealth 0.62 0.63 0.88 0.93 0.94
Share (E)
Assets 0.17 0.26 0.59 0.74 0.81
Income 0.17 0.21 0.33 0.35 0.51
Asset Share (E)
Top 1% 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.30 0.34
Top 5% 0.26 0.26 0.59 0.73 0.77
Top 10% 0.41 0.42 0.81 0.92 0.95
Top 20% 0.62 0.64 0.96 1.00 1.00
Income Share (E)
Top 1% 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.18
Top 5% 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.30 0.42
Top 10% 0.21 0.22 0.35 0.39 0.51
Top 20% 0.35 0.36 0.46 0.57 0.66
Notes: Share of assets and income of entrepreneurs (E).
equity premium of 2.8% in the steady state from a borrowing constraint especially among the
small and financially constrained entrepreneurs (equity premium as much as 20%).
8.6 Distribution of Assets and Income
Table 4 shows the distribution of assets and income in the economy. Gini coefficients of inequality
are lower than in the data for full risk sharing but very close in economies with frictions.
The more severe financial frictions the more unequal the economies become. Note that the
large share of assets held by entrepreneurs is not due to a similarly large share of income: en-
trepreneurs save more in order to insure and accumulate collateral. With information frictions,
top 5% of the population holds more than 50% of wealth. In default with low recovery rates
entrepreneurs hold most of the assets. As in developing countries, in autarky they control 81%
of assets and receive 51% of income.
8.7 Leverage Bounds
Figure 3 shows leverage bounds (dashed line) and the allocation of capital to entrepreneurs with
the highest signal shock zH (solid line) as a function of assets at equilibrium prices in each steady
state. The top left panel represents the optimal allocation in the economy with full risk sharing,
where the allocation of capital is a horizontal line independent of assets. In all other steady states,
the allocation of capital is sub-optimal, that is increasing in assets, i.e., in collateral available to
an entrepreneur. Each alleviation of the financing constraint increases efficiency as entrepreneurs
with a high skill signal z can enter or expand their firms, while general equilibrium effects provide
incentives for low skill entrepreneurs to reduce their firms or exit and become workers.
The leverage upper bounds increase as assets in the definition of the leverage bounds dominate
over expected output. Leverage decreases in entrepreneurial wealth in all economies. The poorer
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Figure 3: Capital Allocation and Leverage Bounds
Leverage bounds (dashed line) and the allocation of capital by entrepreneurs with the
highest signal shock zH (solid line) as functions of assets.
entrepreneurs need to borrow while for wealthy entrepreneurs who are net depositors the ratio
is less than one. As in Geanakoplos (2006) and Geanakoplos (2011), leverage cycle creates an
inefficient mix of skills, especially with respect to the marginal entrepreneur who is indifferent
between being a worker or an entrepreneur, and whose skills are higher if leverage is possible and
financial markets work efficiently.
8.8 Optimal Capital
Figure 4 displays the ratio of capital to the optimal capital (unconstrained allocation) at the
equilibrium prices in each steady state. These ratios are shown for three highest signal shocks
(zH , zM , zL) as functions of assets (the marks represent deciles in asset distribution of en-
trepreneurs).
The ratio is one for all shocks in the full risk sharing economy. In all other panels, the ratio
is less than one and lower for higher signal productivity shocks. This is important as market
frictions constrain more the most productive entrepreneurs. The case of imperfect monitoring in
the left-bottom panel is revealing as entrepreneurs with highest skill (+ lines) are constrained
by potential adverse selection and misreporting to low levels of capital in order to not provide
incentives for agents with lower skills to pretend they have higher skill.
Without the imperfect monitoring problem,the economies are more efficient as only en-
trepreneurs with the two highest shocks enter. Imperfect monitoring allow also the least efficient
agents to enter ( lines) as collaterized assets become relatively more important than skills. Note
that the most severe frictions require more assets to enter.
With default, poor but highly skilled entrepreneurs cannot borrow as much and the ratio is
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Figure 4: Optimal Capital Allocation
The ratio of capital to the optimal capital (unconstrained allocation) at the equi-
librium prices in steady states. Ratios are shown for three highest signal shocks
(zH(+), zM (×), zL()) as functions of assets.
0.3 for the first wealth decile. Under imperfect monitoring, the capital allocation is extremely
inefficient at low wealth levels: for the most skilled entrepreneurs, the ratio is below around 10%
even for the median agent.
8.9 Macro-Prudential Policy: Maximum Leverage Regulation
During a leverage cycle there is too much leverage in normal times and therefore too high asset
prices. In bad times, there is too little leverage and therefore too low asset prices. During
the most recent leverage cycle after 2006, leverage gradually rose because of low volatility and
technological innovation in financial markets had stretched the available collateral. After a bad
and scary news (increase in mortgage delinquencies) increased volatility, leverage as well as prices
fell dramatically. The average downpayment (margin) for mortgages fell from 14% in 2000 to
2.7% in the second quarter of 2006 (home prices reached their peak at the same time). After the
crisis the margin increased to 25-30%. 12 Importantly, during this time period the interest rates
have not changed.
Leverage bounds derived in this model are used to simulate the tradeoff from the leverage ratio
macro-prudential regulation: in good times, restricting leverage is costly as it limits the efficient
allocation of resources to their most productive use. On the other hand, the regulation provides
incentives for accumulation of assets that prevent excessive deleveraging during a recession or
after a change of regulatory framework. In this model, good times are modelled as steady states
without information frictions with full risk sharing, with each steady state characterized by a
different values of the collateral margin that can be mapped back to asymmetric information or
12Hedge fund margins on AAA securities increased from 5% to 70% during the same time.
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Figure 5: Transition After Information Regime Change
Transition from the steady state of the economy with full risk sharing to steady states of
economies with imperfect monitoring. Leverage margins at 0%, 20% and 40%.
financial frictions: from 0% (no downpayment), to 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40% collateral margin
required for each loan, respectively.
These steady states with full information, full risk-sharing are exposed to an unanticipated,
permanent change in informational regime in which financial institutions start requiring truth-
telling incentive compatible contracts for imperfect monitoring and/or default. In other words,
the initial risk-sharing steady states represent the long moderation period when all actors believe
they are in the good state of the economy when default or asymmetric frictions are not binding
(for example, due to government policies promoting borrowing or home ownership). Then a scary
bad news occurs and the markets realize the presence of asymmetric information problems and/or
default and provide contracts with incentive-compatible allocations.
The question is then by how much and at which cost in terms of efficiency and welfare in both
steady states the leverage ratio regulation alleviates the effects of the information regime change
during the transition. The macroprudential policies are implemented by imposing the same
maximum leverage ratio (or, equivalently, minimum collateral margins m) in both the initial
risk-sharing steady state and the imperfect monitoring/default steady states. These policies are
kept the same in the initial and terminal steady states as well as during the transition. The goal
is to evaluate the effects of macroprudential policies on the steady-state allocations and their
behavior during the transition to new steady-state. In other words, the numerical simulations
analyze the maximum leverage regulation tradeoff between lower efficiency in the steady state
and lower efficiency losses during a crisis.
Figure 5 shows transition paths for interest rate, wage, occupational choice, and TFP paths
after the change of the information regime from full information to imperfect monitoring. (the
unanticipated transition starts in period 1). The green line shows allocation for a zero margin
(m = 0%) requirement, the blue line for a m = 20%, and the red line for a m = 40% margin
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Figure 6: Transition After Information Regime Change
Transition from the steady state of the economy with full risk sharing to steady states of
economies with imperfect monitoring. Leverage margins at 0%, 20% and 40%.
requirement.
If no minimal margins are imposed (m = 0%), the suddenly imposed incentive compatible
contracts in the first period reallocate resources to less skilled but more wealthy agents with
collateral. As there is now lower demand for productive capital, interest rates fall from 4.5% to
2.2%, productivity falls by 25% and so do wages (by 15-20%). As the more efficient but poor
entrepreneurs exit, more inefficient agents enter and the fraction of entrepreneurs almost doubles.
When collateral margins are required, the reallocation is less severe, especially in the case of 40%
downpayment.
Figure 6 shows transition paths for assets, capital, leverage and output per average en-
trepreneur. As imperfect monitoring polices require more capital as collateral, average en-
trepreneurs accumulate more assets but use much lower leverage. Capital and output recover
after their initial falls.
Figure 1 summarizes the efficiency tradeoffs from imposing leverage bounds. The stars show
GDP losses in the risk sharing (x-axis) and imperfect monitoring (y-axis) steady states from
imposing collateral margins on loans at 0%, 10%, ..., 40%. For example, imposing a 30% down-
payment margin leads to 0.012% of GDP loss in the risk sharing steady state and to 0.07%
loss in the imperfect monitoring steady state, both relative to zero margin steady states. When
the change in information regime impacts the risk-sharing steady state, the fall of GDP in the
first period of transition is 2.9% (the arrow to m = 30%). When there is no collateral margin
requirement (m = 0%), the initial loss in transition is 7.1%.
The initial and terminal steady states for different downpayment margin requirements are
similar in aggregate levels of productive capital, output and consumption. This is due to general
equilibrium effects that provide incentives to accumulate assets that serve as buffer stock and
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collateral for potential entrepreneurial projects. The steady state losses from leverage regulation
do not exceed 1% of GDP.
9 Conclusions
Possibly the best policy to prevent a future financial crisis is to act before it occurs. Macropru-
dential policies have been formulated in order to alleviate macroeconomic and financial markets
imbalances. At the EU level, the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) has been designed
to detect, prevent and correct problems at their early stages by constructing a set of macroeco-
nomic indicators with subsequent excessive imbalance procedures. Regulating maximal leverage
in good times might be a policy that can achieve this end.
This model generates endogenous leverage bounds when a possibility of default and imperfect
monitoring are present, individually or jointly, in an environment that does not display irra-
tional behavior or expectations. These bounds provide a guidance for leverage management as a
prevention against a future crisis.
The contribution of this papers is twofold. First, it develops a novel approach of modelling
asymmetric information. In particular, the adverse selection problem for entrepreneurial or firm
decisions can be applied to a wide variety of economic problems. Second, the paper simulates
macroprudential policy in an environment with imperfect monitoring and default, using the de-
rived leverage bounds. Many features important for macroprudential policies are left for future
research: a countercyclical variation of the leverage ratio over the business cycle, alternative def-
inition of accounting variables in the leverage ratio, differential regulation of different assets and
contracts, the regulation of related indicators (loan-to-value, loan-to-income, among others), and
finally, the degree of complementarity to risk-weighted capital requirements.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Optimal Allocations
10.1.1 Worker’s Problem
A worker characterized by the state variables (a, z) solves
vW (a, z) =
{
E
[
max
c,a′
{
u(c) + βv(a′, z′)
}]}
,
subject to the budget constraint (with a Lagrange multiplier µ for each z′)
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r)a+ z′wn,
The envelope condition is
vWa (a, z) = (1 + r)E[µ],
and the first order condition with respect to consumption for each z′ is
uc(c) = µ,
the first order condition with respect to savings for each z′
βva(a
′, z′) = µ.
These conditions imply that the usual first-order intertemporal condition
uc(c) = (1 + r)βE[uc(c
′)].
10.1.2 Entrepreneur’s Problem
In the benchmark case without risk-sharing, an entrepreneur characterized by the state variables
(a, z) solves
vE(a, z) = max
k,n
{
E
[
max
c,a′
{
u(c) + βv(a′, z′)
}]}
,
subject to the budget constraint (with a Lagrange multiplier µ for each z′)
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r)a+ z′f(k, z˜n)− z˜wn− (r + δ)k,
and the exogenous collateral constraint (with a Lagrange multiplier η)
0 ≤ κa− k.
The envelope condition is
vEa (a, z) = (1 + r)E[µ] + ηκ,
the first order condition with respect to capital input is
E
[
µ
(
z′fk − (r + δ)
)]− η = 0,
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the first order condition with respect to labor input is
E
[
µ
(
z′fn − z˜w
)]
= 0,
the first order condition with respect to consumption for each z′ is
uc(c) = µ,
the first order condition with respect to savings for each z′
βva(a
′, z′) = µ.
These conditions imply that, after the uncertainty is realized,
βva(a
′, z′) = uc(c),
and that
uc(c) = (1 + r)βE[uc(c
′)] + ηκ.
If the collateral constraint does not bind and η = 0, this is the usual intertemporal condition.
If it binds with respect to the next period’s business project, the optimal decision is to decrease
consumption today and save more.
With risk sharing, an entrepreneur (a, z) solves
vE(a, z) = max
x∈[0,1]
k,n
{
E
[
max
c,a′
{
u(c) + βv(a′, z′)
} |z]} ,
subject to the budget constraint (again with a Lagrange multiplier µ for each z′)
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r)a+ xE [z′|z] f(k, z˜n) + (1− x)z′f(k, z˜n)− z˜wn− (r + δ)k,
and the exogenous collateral constraint as above with a Lagrange multiplier η.
The first order conditions that differ from the benchmark case are with respect to capital
input,
E
[
µ
(
xE
[
z′|z] fk + (1− x)z′fk − (r + δ))]+ ηxE [z′|z] fk − η = 0,
with respect to labor input,
E
[
µ
(
xE
[
z′|z] fn + (1− x)z′fn − z˜w)]+ ηxE [z′|z] fn = 0,
and the first order condition with respect to risk sharing
E
[
µ
(
E
[
z′|z] f − z′f)] = 0.
10.1.3 Capital-Labor Ratio
From the first order condition with respect to capital and labor inputs,
fkE
[
z′uc(c)
](
1− 1− α
α
r + δ
z˜w
)
= η. (30)
At asset levels where the collateral constraint does not bind a > aκ the unconstrained bor-
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rowing entrepreneurs with η = 0 and
χ ≡ k
n
=
(
α
1− α
)(
wz˜
r + δ
)
.
For the constrained borrowing entrepreneurs η > 0, the left-hand side of equation (30) is
positive only if
χκ ≡ k
n
<
(
α
1− α
)(
wz˜
r + δ
)
= κ.
10.1.4 Expected Profit
Using the capital-labor ratio,
E[pi|z] = E[z′|z]f(k, z˜n)− wz˜n− (r + δ)k = E[z′|z]χ(α−1)θkθ − r + δ
α
k.
10.1.5 Optimal Allocation of Capital
From the first-order conditions and the capital-labor ratio,
k(z) =
(
θαE[z′|z]χ(α−1)θ
r + δ
) 1
1−θ
.
10.2 Leverage Bounds
Using the capital-labor ratios χ in the endogenous financing constraint above, there is an upper
bound for the collateral constraint above which it will not bind because the endogenous financing
constraint would be violated,
k ≤ α1 + r
r + δ
a+
α
r + δ
xE[z′|z]f(k, z˜n).
The collateral constraint will not bind for the depositing entrepreneurs.
10.3 Private Equity Premium
Using the fact that cov(X,Y ) = E[XY ]− E[X]E[Y ], from the first order condition for capital
cov
(
uc(c), xE[z
′|z]fk + (1− x)z′fk − r − δ
)
+E[uc(c)|z]E
[
xE[z′|z]fk + (1− x)z′fk − r − δ
]
= η,
which can be simplified as
cov
(
uc(c), (1− x)z′fk
)
+ E[uc(c)|z]E
[
xE[z′|z]fk + (1− x)z′fk − r − δ
]
= η.
Dividing by E[uc(c)] and rearranging,
(1− x)cov (uc(c), z
′fk)
E[uc(c)|z] + (1− x)E[z
′|z]fk − r − δ + xE[z′|z]fk = η
E[uc(c)|z] .
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E[z′|z]fk − r − δ = η
E[uc(c)|z] − (1− x)
cov (uc(c), z
′fk)
E[uc(c)|z] ,
Applying the analysis from the capital-labor ratio above, the private equity premium is higher
for the constrained borrowing entrepreneurs (with η > 0).
10.4 Degree of Risk Sharing
Using a notation f ≡ f(k, z˜n), from the first order condition with respect to risk sharing,
E
[
uc(c)
(
E
[
z′|z] f − z′f) |z] = 0,
cov
(
uc(c), E[z
′|z]f − z′f)+ E[uc(c)|z]E [E[z′|z]f − z′f |z] = 0,
which implies
cov
(
uc(c), z
′f
)
= 0.
As marginal utility from consumption is always positive, this can only hold only under full risk
sharing x = 1 for all (a, z).
10.5 One-Period Gains
10.5.1 One-Period Gains from Default
Using the notation fˆ = f(k(a, zˆ), n(a, zˆ)), the one-period expected gain from defaulting ex-post
for each pair of (z, zˆ) is
E[∆|z] = (1− δ)k + E[z′|z]f − wz˜n− ρD − ((1− δ)k + E[z′|z]f − wz˜n− E[ρ(z′)|z])
= (1 + r)b+ xfE[z′ − E[z′|z]|z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−γ(1 + r)b
= (1− γ)(1 + r)b.
10.5.2 One-Period Gains from Ex-Ante Default
Using the notation fˆ = f(k(a, zˆ), n(a, zˆ)), the one-period expected gain from defaulting ex-post
for each pair of (z, zˆ) is
E[∆|z] = (1− δ)k − ρD − ((1− δ)k + E[z′|z]f − wz˜n− E[ρ(z′)|z])
= xfE[z′ − E[z′|z]|z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−γ(1 + r)b− (E[z′|z]f − wz˜n− (1 + r)b)
= (1− γ)(1 + r)b− (E[z′|z]f − wz˜n) .
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10.5.3 One-Period Gains from Imperfect Monitoring
Using the notation fˆ = f(k(a, zˆ), n(a, zˆ)), the one-period expected gain from imperfect monitoring
for each pair of (z, zˆ) is
E[∆|z] = (1− δ)kˆ + E[z′|z]fˆ − wz˜nˆ− E[ρˆ(zˆ′(z′))|zˆ]|z]− ((1− δ)k + E[z′|z]f − wz˜n− E[ρ(z′)|z])
= (1− δ)(kˆ − k) + E[z′|z](fˆ − f)− wz˜(nˆ− n)− (1 + r)(bˆ− b)
+xfE[z′ − E[z′|z]|z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−xˆfˆE[zˆ′(z′)− E[z′|zˆ]|z]
= E[z′|z](fˆ − f)− wz˜(nˆ− n)− (r + δ)(kˆ − k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[∆pi|z] Profit
−xˆfˆE[zˆ′(z′)− E[z′|zˆ]|z]
= E[∆pi|z]− xˆfˆE[zˆ′(z′)− E[z′|zˆ]|z]
= E[∆pi|z] + xˆfˆE[E[z′|zˆ]− zˆ′(z′)|z]
= E[∆pi|z] + xˆf(kˆ, z˜nˆ) (E [E [z′|zˆ]− z′|z])+ xˆf(kˆ, z˜nˆ)E [E [z′|z]− zˆ′(z′)|z]
= E[∆pi|z] + xˆf(kˆ, z˜nˆ) (E [z′|zˆ]− E [z′|z])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex−Ante
+ xˆf(kˆ, z˜nˆ)E
[
z′ − zˆ′(z′)|z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ex−Post
.
10.5.4 One-Period Gains from Imperfect Monitoring and Default
Using the notation fˆ = f(k(a, zˆ), n(a, zˆ)), the one-period expected gain from imperfect monitoring
and default for each pair of (z, zˆ) is
E[∆|z] = (1− δ)kˆ + E[z′|z]fˆ − wz˜nˆ− ρˆD − ((1− δ)k + E[z′|z]f − wz˜n− E[ρ(z′)|z])
= (1− δ)(kˆ − k) + E[z′|z](fˆ − f)− wz˜(nˆ− n) + (1 + r)b− γ(1 + r)bˆ
+xfE[z′ − E[z′|z]|z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= E[z′|z](fˆ − f)− wz˜(nˆ− n)− (r + δ)(kˆ − k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[∆pi|z] Profit
+(1− γ)(1 + r)bˆ.
10.5.5 One-Period Gains from Imperfect Monitoring and Ex-Ante Default
Using the notation fˆ = f(k(a, zˆ), n(a, zˆ)), the one-period expected gain from imperfect monitoring
and ex-ante default for each pair of (z, zˆ) is
E[∆|z] = (1− δ)kˆ − ρˆD − ((1− δ)k + E[z′|z]f − wz˜n− E[ρ(z′)|z])
= (1− δ)(kˆ − k)− (E[z′|z]f − wz˜n)− (1 + r)b)+ xfE[z′ − E[z′|z]|z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−γ(1 + r)bˆ
= (1− γ)(1 + r)bˆ−
(
E[z′|z]f − wz˜n− (r + δ)(bˆ− b)
)
.
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10.6 The Economy Without Financial Intermediation
For the economy without financial intermediation, the financing constraint implies
a ≥
(
wz˜n
δk
+ 1
)
δk.
For some agents with lots of assets it may be optimal not to use all assets as capital. In that case,
k < a and η = 0. Plugging these values into first order conditions produces the capital labor
ratio
κA ≡ k
n
=
α
1− α
wz˜
δ
.
Notice for these agents the financing constraint is
k ≤ α
δ
a.
Because, in general, α > δ, these agents are not financially constrained. On the other hand, for
some agents k = a so that η > 0. In this case, the financing constraint reads
n ≤
(
1− δ
wz˜
)
a.
Agents with relatively low levels of assets, a, and high skills may be constrained in their choices
of inputs. For a given level of assets, these agents will show higher capital-labor ratios than
unconstrained agents and, therefore, larger marginal productivity of capital.
With these expressions in mind, it is easy to see that opening up the credit market im-
proves the aggregate efficiency. Constrained agents with high skills will tend to borrow as their
marginal product of capital is high. On the contrary, low skill unconstrained entrepreneurs with
low marginal productivity of capital will be inclined to deposit. Eventually, for some low skill
entrepreneurs, it will be more convenient to deposit all their assets, exit entrepreneurship and be
workers.
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